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ABSTRACT
From May 2016 to March 2017, 22 poultry outbreaks of avian influenza A(H5N1) were reported in Cameroon, mainly in
poultry farms and live bird markets. No human cases were reported. In this study, we sought to describe the 2016 A
(H5N1) outbreak strain and to investigate the risk of infection in exposed individuals. We find that highly pathogenic
influenza subtype A(H5N1), clade 2.3.2.1c from Cameroon is closely related phylogenetically and antigenically to strains
isolated in central and western Africa at the time. No molecular markers of increased human transmissibility were noted;
however, seroconversion was detected in two poultry workers (1.5% of total screened). Therefore, the continued
outbreaks of avian influenza in poultry and the risk of zoonotic human infection highlight the crucial need for continued
and vigilant influenza surveillance and research in Africa, especially in areas of high poultry trade, such as Cameroon.
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Introduction
Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) pre-
sents a major concern to the poultry industry. HPAI A
(H5N1) viruses have caused thousands of outbreaks in
poultry worldwide, killing tens of millions of birds and
necessitating the culling of hundreds of millions more
[1,2]. Since first emerging in Asia in 1996, the Eurasian
lineage of influenza A(H5N1) has become enzootic,
especially in Southeast Asia, and has spread globally
throughout Asia, Europe, Africa, and North America
[2,3]. Although sustained human-to-human trans-
mission has not been reported, HPAI A(H5N1) viruses
remain a significant public health concern and it may be
only a matter of time before the virus becomes transmis-
sible in humans [4,5]. To date, 856 human cases of A
(H5N1) infection have been reported with 454 deaths
(case fatality rate: 53%) [6]. The majority of human
cases are associated with exposure to infected poultry
at live bird markets (LBMs) or backyard farms [7].
HPAI A(H5N1) viruses have been detected in Afri-
can countries since 2006. The first outbreak was
recorded in Kaduna State, Nigeria, in mid-January
2006. Less than a month later, the virus was detected
in Egypt, Niger, and Cameroon [8]. Since that time,
further HPAIV outbreaks have been recorded in Bur-
kina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon,
Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, Togo, South
Africa, Uganda, and Zimbabwe [9]. In West Africa,
HPAIV outbreaks occurring between 2006 and 2008
were exclusively caused by clade 2.2 viruses [10]. Fol-
lowing a 6-year disappearance, HPAIV A(H5N1) was
detected in an LBM in Lagos State in southwestern
Nigeria in December of 2014; however, this virus
belonged to clade 2.3.2.1c. This HPAIV quickly spread
throughout West Africa to Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire,
Ghana, and Niger during 2015 then appeared in Cen-
tral Africa in 2016 [9,11]. No human cases have been
reported to date.
Cameroon is a Central African country made up
of 10 administrative regions. Yaoundé, the capital
city, is located in the Centre region of the country
and is the second largest city in Cameroon. After
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Nigeria, Cameroon is the second highest poultry
producer in West and Central Africa. LBMs are
common in Cameroon and represent the major
source of domestic poultry commerce while poultry
farms supply the industrial and commercial indus-
tries. Therefore, while the poultry industry rep-
resents a flourishing economic sector in Cameroon,
rates of occupational exposure to avian influenza
virus remain unknown [12].
In Cameroon, three outbreaks of HPAIV A(H5N1)
occurred between 21 February and 16 March in 2006 in
ducks in three different localities in the northern part of
the country and caused more than a hundred poultry
deaths. In response, the government of Cameroon set
up a biosafety zone in order to contain the virus [13].
In May 2016, following an 8-year absence, Yaoundé
experienced another outbreak of HPAIV A(H5N1) in
a poultry farm with approximately 15,000 bird deaths
(45.5% of birds in the facility). Following this outbreak,
21 additional outbreaks of HPAIV A(H5N1) were
reported between May 2016 and March 2017 in four
regions of Cameroon (Centre, South, West, and Ada-
mawa) resulting in 24,668 poultry deaths and the cul-
ling of more than 76,000 birds [14]. No human cases
were reported. In this study, we sought to describe
the 2016 HPAIV A(H5N1) outbreak strain and to
investigate the risk of subclinical human infections
with avian influenza in exposed poultry workers.
Results
Prevalence and detection of influenza A(H5N1)
in poultry in Cameroon
Overall, 147 poultry samples from 7 regions in 19 total
sites (Figure 1; Supplemental Table 1) were sent to the
Centre Pasteur du Cameroon (CPC) for analyses
between 24 May and 11 June 2016. Total prevalence
of confirmed influenza A by RT-qPCR analysis was
39.5% (n = 58) with 34 of these samples (58.6% of
influenza positive birds) confirmed as HPAIV A
(H5N1) (Table 1).
A(H5N1) viruses from Cameroon in 2016 are of
the clade 2.3.2.1c
Topology of the phylogenetic trees for the haemagglu-
tinin (HA) gene of representative isolates of HPAIV A
Figure 1. Map of poultry and human sampling sites in Cameroon. Sites where sampling took place for avian influenza prevalence
and exposure are indicated on the map of Cameroon in central Africa. Blue squares represent poultry sampling locations. Red stars
indicate human sampling locations.
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(H5N1) viruses from Cameroon indicates that these
viruses fall into genetic clade 2.3.2.1c (Figures 2 and
3; Supplemental Figure 1). All genes from representa-
tive viruses were closely related to sequences from
West Africa [15,16] (99% sequence identity, Sup-
plemental Table 4) as well as with the sequences
from Europe and Asia suggesting a common virus pro-
genitor. As previously reported [16], the PB2 gene seg-
ment of the representative Cameroon isolates appears
to be a result of genetic reassortment between A
(H5N1) and A(H9N2), similar to other viruses circu-
lating in African and Asian countries [15,16].
Table 1. Number and percentage of influenza A(H5N1) positive
samples identified in poultry in Cameroon between May and
June 2016.
Number of
samples
Influenza A
n (% total)
A(H5N1) n
(% flu
positive)
Time period May 2016 56 13 (23.2) 12 (92.3)
June 2016 91 31 (34.1) 22 (71.0)
Region Adamawa 27 n.d. n.d.
Centre 59 19 (32.2) 15 (78.9)
East 8 n.d. n.d.
North West 3 1 (33.3) n.d.
South 24 11 (45.8) 6 (54.5)
West 26 13 (50) 13 (100)
Total 147 58 (39.5) 34 (58.6)
Note: n.d.: not detected.
Figure 2. Phylogenetic analysis of the A(H5N1) haemagglutinin (HA) genes from representative viruses from Cameroon (A). The
phylogenetic tree was generated using the maximum-likelihood method. Bootstrap values (n = 500) > 70 are shown. Scale bars
indicate substitutions per site. Sequences from representative Cameroonian strains included in the study are indicated in bold
and italic. Other control strains are indicated in bold. Representative Cameroonian isolates used in the study for antigenic analysis
are indicated with black stars while control strains are indicated with black circles. Amino acid differences determined in represen-
tative strains as compared to other clade 2.3.2.1c HA genes are indicated in red on the model (B). Positions are stated under H5
numbering.
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Molecular characterization of avian viruses
As expected, all of the representative Cameroonian A
(H5N1) viruses possessed molecular markers charac-
teristic of HPAI viruses including a multibasic amino
acid cleavage site motif, PQRERRRKR*G. Interestingly,
amino acid comparison of the HA gene of the Camer-
oonian isolates from this study and other 2.3.2.1c
strains from West Africa, Europe, and China revealed
two major mutations: I200V and A238T (H5 number-
ing, Table 2, Figure 2). No other known specific
mutations, such as at positions 222 or 224 [17] were
detected in the HA protein. Representative isolates
also contain a deletion of the NA stalk motif known
to increase pathogenicity in mice and chickens [18].
Figure 3. Phylogenetic analysis of the A(H5N1) neuraminidase (NA) genes from representative viruses from Cameroon. The phy-
logenetic tree was generated using the maximum-likelihood method. Bootstrap values (n = 500) > 70 are shown. Scale bars indicate
substitutions per site. Sequences from representative Cameroonian strains included in the study are indicated in bold and italic.
Other control strains are indicated in bold. Representative Cameroonian isolates used for antigenic analysis are indicated with
black stars while control strains are indicated with black circles.
Table 2. Comparison of amino acids in the HA gene from
representative Cameroonian strains used in this study and
other 2.3.2.1c strains.
Protein Positiona H5N1 Cameroon West African strains Europe China
HA 68 G G G S/D
145 G R (Niger, G) R R
200 V I I I
238 T A A A
aH5 numbering.
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No gene mutations associated with antiviral resistance
[19] were detected in any strain analysed in this study.
Mutations associated with mammalian adaptation in
the PB2 gene, namely E627K and D701N [20], were
not detected.
Antigenic testing of Cameroon isolates
Representative viral isolates from Cameroon showed
highest cross-reaction against 2.3.2.1c virus antibodies,
especially against the 2015 strain from Ghana
(A/chicken/Ghana/7/2015). As shown in previous
studies [21], strongest reactivity was noted with horse
and human type O red blood cells (RBCs; Table 3).
No detection of avian influenza infection in
nasaopharyngeal or oral swabs from poultry
workers in Cameroon
A total of 663 subjects were sampled for exposure to
avian influenza based on presence on a farm or in a
market where dead or dying poultry was identified.
Swab samples (pooled NP and OP samples) were col-
lected from 5 regions encompassing 7 total sites
(Figure 1; Supplemental Table 1) during the outbreak
period between May and July 2016. Overall, the study
population age ranged from 6 months to 80 years
with a mean age of 31 years. The majority of the poten-
tially exposed population was male with a male/female
sex ratio of 3:1. No samples were positive for avian
influenza (subtypes H5 and H7) by RT-qPCR; how-
ever, 2.3% (15/663) of the samples were positive for
influenza A virus, 73.3% (11/15) of which were positive
for the human seasonal A(H3N2) subtype (Table 4).
Prior exposure and seroconversion in a
longitudinal human serosurvey for A(H5N1)
infection in poultry workers from Cameroon
Despite not being able to detect any active avian
influenza infections in poultry workers, longitudinal
serosurvey suggested both prior exposure and sero-
conversion against Cameroonian strains of HPAIV
A(H5N1) among poultry farm and LBM workers
exposed to diseased or dead poultry. Of the 131 par-
ticipants selected for serological analysis, 16 (12.2%)
had the possible presence of antibodies against A
(H5N1) isolates from Cameroon with a reciprocal
HAI titre ≥ 10 on the second sampling. Three
(2.3%) of these individuals had reciprocal HAI titre
≥ 20. Of the individuals positive in the second
sampling, 2 (1.5%) were found to have a 4-fold
increase in HAI titre between the first and second
serum collections, suggesting seroconversion. Interest-
ingly, some poultry farm and LBM workers showed
an increased seroprevalence against the control Cam-
bodian 2.3.2.1c virus strain (A/environment/
Cambodia/z2EP1e3W7M1/2015) used for testing;
however, it is unclear whether this could be from
prior exposure or cross-reactivity due to the lack of
cognate antiserum against this viral strain for analysis
(Supplemental Table 6).
Discussion
Overall, these studies utilizing representative isolates
indicate that HPAI A(H5N1) viruses circulating in
Cameroon in 2016 were of the clade 2.3.2.1c and
were closely related to other outbreak strains isolated
during the same period across West and Central Africa.
While it is unclear exactly how A(H5N1) was intro-
duced into Cameroon, it is hypothesized that migration
of infected waterfowl and/or trade of domestic poultry
with neighbouring countries could serve as possible
sources. Since Nigeria was the first country in Africa
to report HPAIV A(H5N1) [16], it is hypothesized
that all A(H5N1) strains in West and Central Africa
from this outbreak period likely originated from a
Nigerian source. These strains may have been intro-
duced into Africa from Asia, where there were reports
of hundreds of migratory birds found dead in January
2015 due to exposure to a novel, reassortant HPAIV
possessing a clade 2.3.2.1c HA gene and an H9N2-
derived PB2 gene [22]. Aside from direct introduction
from Asia into Nigeria [16], these viruses could also
have been introduced into West and, subsequently,
Central Africa through the westward spread of clade
2.3.2.1c viruses on a global scale from unidentified
Asian sources [23]. Indeed, 2.3.2.1c viruses isolated in
Dubai in 2014 are in the direct ancestry of viruses
detected in West Africa, suggesting a possible step-
ping-stone. However, a direct pathway of spread into
Nigeria remains unclear. Further sequencing and
analysis of larger data sets than the representative iso-
lates included in this study are warranted to better
determine the viral origin.
While no active AIV infections were detected in
poultry farm and LBM workers, serological results do
suggest exposure to avian influenza viruses in these
high-risk groups, likely through contact with diseased
or dead poultry. No poultry workers reported any
symptoms in relation to acute HPAIV infection. There-
fore, seroconversion determined in this study could be
related to subclinical or very mild cases. This assump-
tion is not unreasonable as clade 2.3.2.1c viruses appear
to have minimal morbidity or mortality in humans, as
exemplified by the drop in number of cases observed in
Cambodia following the A(H5N1) clade replacement
from 1.1.2–2.3.2.1c in 2014 [24]. It is currently unclear
why these 2.3.2.1c viruses are not associated with
severe avian influenza infection in humans. The
A238T mutation observed in the HA of the representa-
tive viruses included in this study has been shown pre-
viously to add a glycolysation site, 236NDT, potentially
190 C. G. Monamele et al.
Table 3. Antigenic analysis of representative A(H5N1) isolates from Cameroon.
Reference antiserum
A/common magpie/Hong Kong/
5052/2007 A/Hong Kong/6841/2010 A/Hubei/1/2010 A/duck/Bangladesh/19097/2013
A/barm swallow/HK/1161/
2010
RBC c t ho hu c t ho hu c t ho hu c T ho hu c t ho hu
Reference virus/antigen Clade
A/common magpie/Hong Kong/5052/2007 2.3.2.1 320 320 2560 1280 320 320 2560 1280 20 20 320 80 80 160 1280 320 40 40 0 160
A/Hong Kong/6841/2010 2.3.2.1 80 40 N/A 320 320 160 N/A 1280 20 20 N/A 80 320 160 N/A 640 20 20 N/A 80
A/Hubei/1/2010 2.3.2.1a 320 320 1280 160 640 640 2560 640 320 320 1280 320 640 1280 2560 640 40 80 0 160
A/duck/Bangladesh/19097/2013 2.3.2.1a 160 160 1280 320 320 640 2560 1280 20 40 320 80 320 640 2560 1280 20 40 10 80
A/barm swallow/HK/1161/2010 2.3.2.1b 80 80 640 320 160 320 1280 1280 10 20 160 80 80 160 1280 640 40 40 0 320
A/duck/VN/NCVD-1584/2012 2.3.2.1c 160 160 N/A 640 640 640 N/A 2560 40 40 N/A 160 640 640 N/A 1280 40 80 N/A 160
A/duck Cambodia/33W2M3/2013 1.1 10 0 80 20 160 80 320 320 20 10 80 80 10 0 40 20 0 0 0 10
A/envir/Cambodia/z2EP1e3W7M1/2015 2.3.2.1c 160 0 2560 10 320 0 2560 10 20 0 320 40 40 10 640 20 20 0 0 20
A/chicken/Cameroon/16V-04338/2015 2.3.2.1c 10 20 320 80 40 80 640 320 0 0 80 20 20 40 160 40 0 0 0 20
A/chicken/Cameroon/16V-3771/2015 2.3.2.1c 40 40 640 160 160 160 1280 640 10 0 160 20 40 80 640 160 10 0 0 20
A/duck/VN/NCVD-1584/2012 A/duck/VN/NCVD-2848/2013 A/duck Cambodia/
33W2M3/2013
A/chicken/Guiyang/1153/2016 A/chicken/Ghana/7/2015
RBC c t ho hu c t ho hu c t ho hu c t ho hu c t ho hu
Reference virus/antigen Clade
A/common magpie/Hong Kong/5052/2007 2.3.2.1 80 80 1280 320 80 160 0 320 0 20 0 20 0 0 160 10 80 80 1280 320
A/Hong Kong/6841/2010 2.3.2.1 320 160 N/A 1280 80 80 N/A 640 0 0 N/A 40 0 0 N/A 20 80 40 N/A 640
A/Hubei/1/2010 2.3.2.1a 160 320 2560 320 80 160 0 640 40 40 0 80 0 10 80 20 80 160 1280 320
A/duck/Bangladesh/19097/2013 2.3.2.1a 160 640 2560 1280 80 160 10 320 0 10 10 20 0 10 10 10 40 80 1280 320
A/barm swallow/HK/1161/2010 2.3.2.1b 80 80 1280 640 40 80 0 320 0 10 0 20 0 10 0 10 40 40 320 160
A/duck/VN/NCVD-1584/2012 2.3.2.1c 640 640 N/A 2560 160 160 N/A 1280 10 10 N/A 40 10 0 N/A 20 160 160 N/A 640
A/duck Cambodia/33W2M3/2013 1.1 20 0 80 40 10 0 0 20 640 160 0 1280 0 0 0 20 80 40 320 160
A/envir/Cambodia/z2EP1e3W7M1/2015 2.3.2.1c 80 10 640 20 80 80 0 320 0 0 0 20 0 0 160 10 40 0 1280 10
A/chicken/Cameroon/16V-04338/2015 2.3.2.1c 20 20 320 80 10 10 0 40 10 10 0 40 0 0 80 0 80 160 1280 320
A/chicken/Cameroon/16V-3771/2015 2.3.2.1c 40 80 640 160 10 20 0 80 10 20 0 40 0 0 160 10 160 320 2560 640
Note: RBC: red blood cells; c: chicken; t: turkey; ho: horse; hu: human; N/A: not available.
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altering infectivity or antigenicity; however, the exact
contribution of this site is unknown [25]. Further, the
contributions of the other HA mutations observed in
these representative viruses have not yet been studied.
In addition, mutations E627K and D701N in the PB2
gene that have been reported to facilitate the adap-
tation of avian viruses to mammals, and increase trans-
mission and/or pathogenicity [20,26,27] were not
observed in the Cameroonian isolates analysed and
could be one contributing factor to the lack of severe
human cases reported in these outbreaks.
Previous reports suggest that asymptomatic and/or
mild avian influenza infections lead to seroconversion
with low antibody titres that quickly decrease below
the World Health Organization (WHO) confirmation
threshold (reciprocal HAI ≥ 160; MN ≥ 80) [28]. For
this reason, we considered as positive all individuals
with a reciprocal HAI titre≥ 40 and a reciprocal MN
titre≥ 40, which is less stringent than the WHO cut-
off levels. However, no current consensus exists on
the antibody titre that results from a mild or asympto-
matic infection, and cut-off values used in previous
studies are inconsistent. Therefore, taking into con-
sideration the antigenic analysis, multiple antigen test-
ing, increases in titres between samplings, and
confirmation by microneutralization testing, the
observed seroconversion in 2 out of the 131 partici-
pants was considered positive. Overall, 2.3% of workers
who participated in the study had antibodies against A
(H5N1) (either pre-existing antibodies or seroconver-
sion). While this prevalence is lower than reported
among LBM workers in Cambodia [29], Thailand
[30], Nigeria [31], or China [32], it is higher than in
studies of poultry workers in Nigeria [33] and residents
of villages with human cases in Thailand [34].
While Cameroon has not experienced an outbreak
of HPAIV A(H5N1) since March of 2017, avian
influenza remains a threat to West and Central Africa
[9]. For many years, the prevalence of avian influenza
in West and Central Africa was thought to be relatively
low [12,35]; however, recently, avian influenza clade
2.3.4.4 (A/H5N8) has been detected in West and Cen-
tral Africa, including Cameroon, and these viruses are
still being detected in Nigeria as recently as September
of 2017 [9]. While thought to have low pathogenicity
and transmissibility in humans [36–38], the spread of
these viruses to Africa highlights the continual risk of
incursion and circulation of new strains. In addition,
with the booming poultry farming industry in the
region, occupational exposure to domestic poultry in
West and Central Africa, including Cameroon, is esti-
mated to be high [12,39]. Therefore, continued out-
breaks and detection of avian influenza in poultry
coupled with the clear and present risk of zoonotic
human infection highlight the crucial need for contin-
ued and vigilant influenza surveillance and research in
Africa, especially in areas of high poultry trade such as
the LBMs and poultry farms of Cameroon.
Materials and methods
Avian samples
Ethical approval
The animal investigation was conducted as part of the
outbreak response in Cameroon at the request of the
Cameroonian veterinary authorities to help in asses-
sing and eradicating the outbreak; thus, it was not con-
sidered to be experimental animal research. CPC serves
as the National Influenza Centre for the country.
Administrative authorizations were obtained from the
Cameroon Ministry of Health in order to control the
spread of infection. Export of samples from Cameroon
into Cambodia followed strict international regulations
(including IATA shipping regulations) as well as
specific regulations according to each individual
country. Institute Pasteur in Cambodia serves as the
WHO Regional H5 Reference Laboratory as well as
the National Influenza Center of Cambodia and has
all approvals and capabilities necessary to work on
highly pathogenic avian influenza. No animal exper-
imentation was performed at IPC.
Table 4. Socio-demographic characteristics and influenza detection in exposed poultry workers and close contacts in Cameroon
between May and July 2016.
Number tested
Number Positive n
(% total)
A/pdmH1N1 n
(% flu positive)
A/H3N2 n
(% flu positive)
Untyped n
(% flu positive)
A(H5N1) n
(% flu positive)
A/H7N9 n
(% flu positive)
Sex Male 481 12 (2.5) n.d. 9 (75.0) 3 (25) n.d. n.d.
Female 157 3 (1.9) n.d. 2 (66.6) 1 (33.3) n.d. n.d.
n/a 25 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Age 0-20. 130 1 (0.8) n.d. n.d. 1 (100) n.d. n.d.
21–40 385 11 (2.9) n.d. 9 (81.8) 2 (18.2) n.d. n.d.
41–60 118 2 (1.7) n.d. 1 (50) 1 (50) n.d. n.d.
61–80 16 1 (6.3) n.d. 1 (100) n.d. n.d. n.d.
n/a 14 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Region Adamawa 97 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Centre 232 7 (3.0) n.d. 6 (85.7) 1 (14.3) n.d. n.d.
Littoral 33 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
South 149 4 (2.7) n.d. 3 (75) 1 (25) n.d. n.d.
West 152 4 (2.6) n.d. 2 (50) 2 (50) n.d. n.d.
Total 663 15 (2.3%) n.d. 11 (73.3) 4 (26.7) n.d. n.d.
Note: n.d.: not detected; n/a: not available.
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Sample collection
During the outbreak period, poultry samples were col-
lected from 7 regions in 19 total sites (Supplemental
Table 1) and sent to Centre Pasteur du Cameroun
(CPC) as well as the National Veterinary Laboratory
where all analyses were performed and confirmed. Tra-
cheal and cloacal swabs were collected in addition to
post-mortem organ biopsies for dead poultry [40].
All samples were placed in 2 mL viral transport med-
ium before transportation to the CPC on ice to main-
tain cold chain.
Nucleic acid extraction and amplification
All samples were processed under BSL3 containment
conditions [41]. Nucleic acids were extracted from
the samples using the QIAamp Viral RNA Mini Kit
(Qiagen, Hilden, Germany) according to the manufac-
turer’s instructions. RNA extracts were tested by quan-
titative real-time reverse-transcriptase polymerase
chain reaction (RT-qPCR) on an ABI Prism 7300 or
7500 thermocycler (Applied Biosystems, Foster City,
California, USA) for the detection of influenza A as
well as H5 and H7 subtypes with the CDC Influenza
typing and sub-typing assay obtained through the
International Reagent Resource Program (IRR,
https://www.internationalreagentresource.org). The
typing and sub-typing assay protocols were conducted
with the enzyme Ambion AgPath-ID™ One-Step RT–
PCR Kit (ThermoFisher Scientific, Massachusetts,
USA). A reaction volume of 25 µL contained 12.5 µL
of 2× reaction mix, 1 µL water, 0.5 µL enzyme, 2 µL
of 10 µM forward primer, 2 µL of 10 µM reverse pri-
mer, 2 µL of 2.5 µM probe and 5 µL RNA extract.
The following program was used for amplification:
30 min at 50°C, 10 min at 95°C, 40 cycles of 15 s at
95°C and 30 s at 55°C. RT-qPCR results with Ct values
below 37 were considered positive.
Samples positive for H5 genes were further analysed
for the presence of N1 gene with the following set of
primers: forward A/N1/+/2 (5′-GCAAAAGCAG-
GAGTTTAAAATGAA-3′), and reverse A/N1/-/1431
(5′-ACTTGTCAATGGTGAATGGCAAC-3′) [13].
Egg isolation and sequencing
To achieve the objectives of characterizing and identi-
fying the HPAIV virus associated with the Cameroo-
nian outbreak, and to have isolates available for
serological testing, three representative samples posi-
tive for the H5 HA gene were selected for isolation
and sequencing at the Pasteur Institute of Cambodia
(IPC). Samples were selected based on Ct value
(<21), availability of sufficient sample, and geographi-
cal origin. Specifically, selected samples represent
three different outbreaks in the Centre and the West
regions of Cameroon. Avian samples were inoculated
into specific pathogen-free, 10 days old embryonated
chicken eggs according to previously published
protocols [42]. Two viral isolates were successfully
recovered following egg inoculation: A/chicken/
Cameroon/16V-04338/2016 and A/chicken/Camer-
oon/16V-3771/2016.
Amplification and Sanger sequencing
Viral isolates were amplified for all genes and analysed
for full genome sequences using the same set of primers
(Supplemental Table 2). The virus from the third
sample could not be isolated after two passages and
was only utilized for full length sequencing of HA
and NA genes due to limited sample for further analy-
sis. Overall a total reaction volume of 50 µL contained
the following reagents: 10 µL of 5× PCR buffer, 2 µL of
10 µM dNTPs, 1 µL of 10 µM forward and reverse pri-
mer, 0.25 µL RNAsin 40 U/µL, 2 µL Qiagen One-step
RT–PCR enzyme and 5 µL RNA. This mixture was
run using the following program: 60°C for 1 min, 42°
C for 10 min, 50°C for 30 min, 95°C for 15 min, 30
cycles at (94°C for 30 s, 55°C for 30 s, 72°C for 90 s)
and 72°C for 7 min. Amplicons were then sequenced
by Sanger sequencing with Big Dye Terminator Reac-
tion Mix (Applied Biosystems) on the ABI 3500XL
genetic analyser. Contiguous sequences were
assembled using CLC Main Workbench 5.5 (Qiagen,
Hilden, Germany).
Phylogenetic analysis
Representative influenza gene sequences were obtained
from the NCBI Influenza Virus Database (https://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genomes/FLU/Database) [43] and
GISAID as accessed in November 2017. Primarily Afri-
can and Asian strains were used for analysis and
incomplete sequences were excluded from the analysis.
Sequence alignment was executed using ClustalW in
BioEdit version 7.2.5 [44]. Phylogenic relationships
and tree construction for each gene were inferred by
Maximum Likelihood (ML) and 500 bootstrap repli-
cates were performed to infer the robustness of the
ML trees using MEGA 6 [45]. Viruses were clustered
on the basis of nucleotides. Only dominant clusters
were used to infer phylogenetic relationships.
Visualization of changes in amino acids of the
haemagglutinin (HA) protein of Cameroon
isolates
Visualization of changes in amino acids on the HA of
Cameroon isolates was performed using PyMOL [46]
based on the structure of the HA of the clade 2.3.2.1
virus A/Hubei/1/2010 (DOI: 10.2210/pdb4kth/pdb)
[47] available on the RCSB Protein Data Bank
(https://www.rcsb.org/pdb/home/home.do).
Antigenic testing of Cameroon isolates
Haemagglutination inhibition assays (HAI) were per-
formed on Receptor Destroying Enzyme (RDE;
Denka Seiken, Tokyo, Japan)-treated samples by
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previously published methodology [48] using chicken,
turkey, horse, and human type O RBCs against the viral
isolates from Cameroon, as well as a number of other
reference antigens and antiserum (Supplemental
Table 3).
Human samples
Ethical approval
The human investigation was conducted as part of a
public health response; thus, in accordance with
human subjects’ protection regulations, it was not con-
sidered to be human subjects’ research. CPC serves as
the National Influenza Centre for Cameroon. Adminis-
trative authorizations were obtained from the Camer-
oon Ministry of Health in order to control the spread
of infection. However, all participants signed an
informed consent form prior to enrolment and sample
collection.
Sample collection
Overall, necessary sample size could not be calculated
as HPAIV A(H5N1) transmission to humans was unli-
kely and the probability of HPAIV infection in Camer-
oon is unknown. Therefore, as part of the outbreak
response, all contact individuals identified to be present
on the farms and in the markets where dead poultry
was detected during the avian influenza outbreak had
their blood collected for serological analyses. The
longitudinal human serological study was performed
during the outbreak period and involved collection of
serum, nasopharyngeal (NP), and oropharyngeal
(OP) swabs (swabs pooled into one tube per subject)
from poultry workers and exposed individuals. Overall,
samples from 633 individuals exposed to sick or dead
poultry during the outbreak period were collected in
5 regions totalling 7 sites (Supplemental Table 1). NP
and OP swabs were placed in viral transport medium
and stored at 4°C prior to transport in a cooler.
Blood specimens were collected from poultry farm
and LBM workers at initial inclusion to form a baseline
and two weeks after for follow-up. Blood samples were
stored at 4°C and sent to the CPC within 24 h preced-
ing collection where they were processed and 1 mL ali-
quots of serum and plasma were frozen at −80°C until
use.
Testing of human samples for influenza infection
by RT-qPCR
RNA was extracted from NP and OP swabs and tested
for influenza A and B viruses by RT-qPCR with the
CDC Influenza A/B typing assay obtained through
the IRR (https://www.internationalreagentresource.
org). Positive samples for influenza A virus were then
tested by RT-qPCR for A(H3N2), A(H1N1)pdm09, A
(H5N1), and A(H7N9) with the corresponding CDC
sub-typing kits available from the IRR. All RT-qPCR
analyses were run on an ABI Prism 7300 or 7500 ther-
mocycler (Applied Biosystems, Foster City, California,
USA) as described earlier. Threshold cycles (Ct values)
below 37 were considered positive for all RT-qPCR
analyses.
Serological analysis for infection with A(H5N1)
One hundred and thirty-one (131) pairs of serum
samples (n = 262 total samples) were selected from
the all of the contact patients based on: (1) the avail-
ability of matched sets of two sera collected within a
two week interval; and, (2) with sufficient volume to
carry out the serological assays. Following RDE treat-
ment, serum samples were tested for HPAIV A
(H5N1) antibodies using HAI as described above and
confirmed with microneutralization assay (MN) using
previously published methodology [49]. HAI analyses
were performed using the two egg isolates from Camer-
oon, reference clade 2.3.2.1 A(H5N1) viruses/antigens
A/common magpie/Hong Kong/5052/2007, A/
environment/Cambodia/z2EP1e3W7M1/2015 and A/
duck/Vietnam/NCVD-1584/2012 using horse and
human RBCs. The second set of sera were first analysed
by HAI for the likelihood of patients with seroconver-
sion. Samples with detectable antibodies in the second
serological draw (HAI titre≥ 10) were then re-tested
by HAI and MN assay utilizing both the first and
second serum samples. Exposure to these viruses was
considered “suspected” with an HAI titre≥ 40 in the
second serum sample and/or seroconversion defined
as the detection of antibodies above the thresholds
(fourfold increase) defined following no detection of
antibodies in the serum sample from the previous
period (Supplemental Table 6).
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